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STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue Presented: The trial court correctly dismissed without prejudice the medical 
negligence claim of plaintiffs/appellants Roger and Marion Snow ("the Snows") for failure 
to timely diagnose and treat Mrs. Snow's ovarian cancer, when it is undisputed there has 
been no recurrence of cancer, under the established precedent of Seale v. Gowans. 923 
P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). This issue was raised in Dr. Irion's Motion to Dismiss Without 
Prejudice. (R. at 24-35, 69-76.) 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this issue on appeal is correctness, 
granting no deference to the trial court's conclusions. Foutz v. City of S. Tordan. 2004 
UT 75, 11 8, 100 P.3d 1171. This Court may affirm on any ground available to the 
district court, even if it is not one relied upon below. Debry v. Noble, 889 P2d 428, 444 
(Utah 1995). 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
There are no legislative provisions which are determinative of the issue presented. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a medical negligence action commenced by the Snows against 
defendant/appellee Richard Irion, M.D. ("Dr. Irion"). (R. at 1-6.) On June 18, 2002, 
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Dr. Irion, a board-certified ob/gyn, performed a vaginal hysterectomy on Mrs. Snow for 
post-menopausal bleeding. (R. at 10.) During surgery he discovered a cyst on her left 
ovary, which ruptured upon removal. (R. at 10-11.) Intra-operative pathology identified 
the cyst as benign, and Dr. Irion completed the surgery without further exploration. The 
final pathology report, however, determined the cyst was cancerous. (R. at 11.) Dr. Irion 
thus referred Mrs. Snow to a gynecologic oncologist and Mrs. Snow underwent cancer 
treatment. (R. at 11.) Mrs. Snow's cancer has been successfully treated, and she has since 
been in remission, with no diagnosis of recurrent cancer. (R. at 11-12, 57.) 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court. 
The Snows commenced legal action against Dr. Irion on April 28, 2004, alleging 
that Dr. Irion failed to timely diagnose and treat Mrs. Snow's cancer and refer her to an 
oncologist. (R. at 1-6, 12-14.) The delay is alleged to have caused a statistically greater 
risk for return of ovarian cancer. (R. at 9-15.) 
On June 15, 2004, Dr. Irion filed a Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice because, 
under Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996) and Medved v. Glenn. 2004 UT 
App. 161, 176, 92 P.3d 176, the Snows are unable as a matter of law to establish a legally 
cognizable injury to satisfy their prima facie claims of medical negligence against Dr. Irion. 
(R. at 24-35.) The trial court granted the Motion and entered its Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice on September 27, 2004. (R. at 95-96.) 
The Snows now appeal from that Order of Dismissal. (R. at 101.) 
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C. Statement of Facts.1 
1. On June 18, 2002, Dr. Richard Irion performed a hysterectomy on 62-year 
old Marion Snow for post-menopausal bleeding. (R. at 10.) 
2. During surgery Dr. Irion observed a cyst on Mrs. Snow's ovary which 
ruptured when he attempted to remove it. (Id.) 
3. The mass turned out to have malignant cells. (R. at 11.) 
4. Mrs. Snow underwent cancer treatment. (Id.) 
5. Mrs. Snow's cancer treatment has been successful. (R. at 11-12.) 
6. The Snows have attested that "there has been no diagnosis of "recurrent5 
cancer since Marion's second surgery on August 13, 2002."2 (R. at 57.) 
7. The Snows make no allegation of injury beyond their claim that there is a 
heightened risk that Mrs. Snow's cancer will return. (R. at 9-15.) 
1
 In support of their appeal, the Snows have recited their allegations of negligence 
as set forth in the Amended Complaint. (Aplt. Br. at 3-4.) While Dr. Irion has reason to 
dispute all of these allegations against him, he did not do so in the context of the Motion 
to Dismiss and does not do so now, accepting all of the allegations of the Amended 
Complaint as true for the limited purpose of his Motion to Dismiss. However, the 
entirety of the factual allegations of the Complaint have no relevance to this Motion, 
which challenged the legal sufficiency of the Complaint due to lack of cognizable legal 
injury. 
2
 The only evidence outside of the allegations of the Amended Complaint 
presented to the trial court was an Affidavit by the Snows, which they submitted in 
opposition to Dr. Irion's Motion to Dismiss. The trial court was entided to consider this 
Affidavit regardless of how the Motion was styled. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). It makes no 
difference whether the trial court treated Dr. Irion's Motion as a Motion to Dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or as a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This case comes before the Court as a straightforward application of the 
definition of "legal injury35 as set forth by Utah Supreme Court in Seale v. Gowans, 923 
P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). Seale is a policy-based decision holding that cancer patients 
seeking damages for a worse statistical prognosis of remaining cancer free because of a 
delay in diagnosis do not have a legal injury unless or until there is a recurrence of cancer. 
Seale prevents litigation over speculative claims that may never arise. It is undisputed that 
Mrs. Snow has not had a recurrence of cancer. Based on Seale, the trial court correctly 
dismissed the Snows5 claims without prejudice. 
II. The Snows cannot circumvent Seale and proceed with a speculative claim for 
damages based on enhanced risk of future cancer because, like the plaintiff in Seale. there is 
no allegation of any current legal injury. 
Moreover, even if the Snows had alleged actual injury (which they do not), 
dismissal is still appropriate under Medved v. Glenn, 2004 UT App. 161, 92 P.3d 176, 
which holds that a medical malpractice plaintiff cannot proceed with a claim for 
heightened risk of cancer recurrence simply because they concurrendy allege actual 
damages. 
III. The Snows' contention of "unfairness" is both one-sided and insufficient to 
allow the trial court to ignore the binding Utah precedent articulated in Seale. which 
requires dismissal of the Snows3 loss of chance claims. The Snows3 requests to indefinitely 
suspend the statute of limitations, or in the alternative to indefinitely allow the case to 
4 
remain on file so they can pursue it if it ever ripens, are without basis in law and the trial 
court correctly denied them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE 
SNOWS5 CLAIMS WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNDER 
SEALE V GOWANS. 
In this medical malpractice lawsuit, the Snows claim Dr. Irion failed to properly 
diagnose and treat Mrs. Snow's ovarian cancer. (R. at 9-15.) The Snows seek damages 
for the heightened risk that Mrs. Snow's cancer will return and for the risk that she 
potentially has a shortened life expectancy. (R. at 11-13.) It is uncontroverted that 
Mrs. Snow's cancer treatment has been successful, (R. at 11), and "there has been no 
diagnosis of'recurrent cancer3 since Marion's second surgery on August 13, 2002." (R. at 
57.) Given these facts, the sole question presented before the trial court and on appeal is 
whether the Snows' claim of increased risk is an actual present injury sufficient to sustain 
their claims of injury against Dr. Irion.3 Under Utah law, it is not. 
Utah does not recognize loss of chance or statistically increased risk of injury as a 
basis for recovery. Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996); see also Medved 
v. Glenn. 2004 UT App. 161, 11 5, 92 P.3d at 178;4 Andersen v. Brigham Young 
3
 Mr. Snow seeks loss of consortium damages, which is by statute a derivative 
claim subject to all of the same defenses as his wife's underlying negligence claim. Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (1998). 
4
 The Snows seek reversal of the trial court's decision on the contention that 
Medved is unfair, erroneous and inconsistent with Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 
5 
University. 879 E Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (D. Utah 1995), afPd, 89 E3d 849 (10th Cir. 
1996). The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "an alleged claim for enhanced risk 
is not adequate to sustain a cause of action for negligence." Seale, 923 P.2d at 1365. 
More specifically, 
the law does not recognize an inchoate wrong, and therefore, 
until there is "actual loss or damage resulting to the interests 
of another," a claim for negligence is not actionable. 
Id. at 1364. 
In this case, the trial court correctly dismissed the Snows' claims without prejudice 
under Seale v. Gowans. In Seale, the plaintiff had a mammogram in August 1987, which 
was read as negative by a radiologist, defendant Dr. Gowans. In May of 1988, the 
plaintiff had another mammogram which revealed a breast mass. A needle biopsy of the 
mass disclosed that it was cancerous. A retrospective review of the 1987 mammogram 
indicated evidence of the breast tumor. The plaintiff had a radical mastectomy and 
pathological studies revealed a second malignant tumor and cancer in her lymph nodes. 
All of the cancer was removed and Ms. Seale remained cancer free until August 1991 at 
which time a bone scan revealed cancer in her left hip. Id. at 1362. 
The plaintiff immediately commenced litigation against Dr. Gowans and Holy 
Cross Hospital, alleging that negligent delay in diagnosing her cancer had allowed the 
1996). (Aplt. Br. at 8-9.) The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Medved 
decision in August 2004. Oral argument was held March 1, 2005. No decision has yet 
been issued. The outcome of the Supreme Court's review of Medved is, however, not 
dispositive of this appeal, as Seale alone supports the trial courts dismissal in this case. 
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cancer to spread to her hip. The defendants sought and were awarded summary judgment 
on the basis that Ms. Seale had failed to commence her action within two years from the 
date she discovered negligence by Dr. Gowans and the hospital. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed this ruling, holding that Ms. Seale had suffered no injury until she discovered the 
recurrence of cancer in her hip in August of 1991. Id. at 1364. 
In the context of the statute of limitations argument, the Seale court held that until 
there is a recurrence of cancer, there is no legally cognizable injury. Id. at 1365. Clearly 
if there is no legal injury sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitation until 
there has been a recurrence, there can be no legal injury sufficient to support a medical 
negligence claim absent a recurrence. The language in Seale is unambiguous on this point: 
[W]e find that defendants failed to prove that Ms. Seale 
suffered a legally cognizable injury when she discovered that 
the cancer had spread to her lymph nodes. The only evidence 
that defendants produced regarding the harmful consequence 
of the cancer's spread was that it increased the risk that the 
cancer would recur. They failed to argue or to produce 
evidence that in 1988, Ms. Seale could complain of any actual 
present damages. Although we agree that the cancer's spread 
resulted in a dramatic increase in Ms. Seale's chance of 
survival, we conclude that without proof of actual damages, an 
alleged claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a 
cause of action for negligence. 
Id. at 1364-65 (emphasis added). Further, "even though there exists a possibility, even a 
probability, of future harm, it is not enough to sustain a claim, and a plaintiff must wait 
until some harm manifests itself." Id. at 1364. 
In this case, the Snows cannot establish they have suffered a legally cognizable 
injury giving rise to a claim. Fortunately, Mrs. Snow's cancer remains in remission and 
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she has not suffered a recurrence. (R. at 11 & 57.) Even if there is, for the sake of 
argument, a statistical possibility or even probability of recurrence, enhanced risk is 
insufficient to sustain a claim at this point. Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364.5 As with the plaintiflF 
in Seale, Mrs. Snow "must wait until some harm manifests itself." Id. Until then, the 
Snows3 claims are premature and legally insufficient to establish a claim of medical 
negligence.6 Their action was thus correctly dismissed without prejudice. Any other 
ruling would have been directly contrary to established Utah law. 
Indeed, carving an exception into Seale to save the Snows3 claims in this case would 
have a far-reaching impact and would obviate medical negligence claims of other would-be 
plaintiffs. Seale has been controlling law in Utah for eight years. Plaintiffs' lawyers in this 
state have relied on Seale and made informed decisions not to initiate litigation in cases 
involving delayed cancer diagnosis until there has been a recurrence of cancer, and trial 
courts have relied on Seale to dismiss cases alleging damages for increased risk. If Seale 
were now interpreted to mean that there is cognizable legal injury before a recurrence, 
5
 See also Andersen, 879 F. Supp. 1124 (plaintiff diagnosed with Hodgkin's 
Disease asserted 6-month delay in diagnosis caused reduction in his chance of survival, and 
the federal district court concluded Utah law "has not adopted a separate cause of action 
permitting recovering for the reduction of a statistical chance of long-term survival . . . . " ) 
6
 The Snows contend that if the trial court is affirmed and their causes of action 
remain dismissed without prejudice, the statute of limitations and the statute of repose 
jeopardize their claims. (Aplt. Br. at 15-17.) Neither the statute of limitations nor the 
statue of repose are issues in this case. Whether the statute of limitations or the statute of 
repose could or would preclude any of the Snows3 claims is purely speculative. Dr. Irion 
did not argue either of these statutes as a basis for his Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, if 
there is no recurrence, there can be no claim that could be subject to either the statute of 
limitations or the statute of repose. These issues are unripe, were not decided by the trial 
court, and are not before this Court on appeal. 
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thus allowing plaintiffs to proceed with claims of heightened risk prior to a recurrence, 
then the claims of many of the plaintiffs who either conscientiously forewent commencing 
suit, or whose claims were dismissed by the court, would be lost as time-barred. There is 
no justification to upset the carefully balanced precedent of Seale and to prove those 
potential plaintiffs, their lawyers and the courts wrong, simply to create the exception 
which the Snows seek. 
POINT II. 
UTAH LAW DOES NOT ALLOW THE SNOWS TO 
PROCEED ON THEIR SPECULATIVE DAMAGE 
CLAIM SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ALSO CLAIM TO 
ALLEGE ACTUAL DAMAGES. 
The Snows contend they should be permitted to proceed because, in addition to 
their claim of damage for a heightened risk of cancer recurrence, they also allege actual 
injury (Aplt. Br. at 4 & 6-7.) The "actual injury" claimed by the Snows in this case is: 
loss of income, impairment of earning capacity, medical costs, "pain, grief, mental anguish, 
depression, emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of life," "permanent injury that has 
substantially changed her lifestyle," inability to perform household and spousal activities, 
and a diminution of their quality of life. (Id.) 
A- THE SNOWS DO NOT ALLEGE ACTUAL INJURY. 
Foremost, the Snows3 allegations of damages do not qualify as an allegation of 
present actual injury. Utah courts have required plaintiffs asserting a claim of medical 
malpractice to prove: 
9 
1) the standard of care required of physicians under similar 
circumstances practicing in the same field or specialty (2) that 
the applicable standard of care was breached, (3) that the 
injury to the plaintiff was proximately caused by the 
defendant's negligence, and (4) that damages occurred as a 
result of defendant's breach of duty. 
Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp. 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis 
added). Allegations of "injury"7 and "damages" are thus separately required. 
Here, the Snows fail to allege an actionable injury.8 The gravamen of the negligent 
conduct alleged is that Dr. Irion failed to timely diagnose the presence of the cyst 
preoperatively, ruptured Mrs. Snow's cyst during surgery and thereby "seeded" cancer cells 
in her abdomen, and failed to timely inform Mrs. Snow regarding the cancer. (R. at 13.) 
None of these things, however, caused Mrs. Snow actual injury because she is in 
remission. Thus, substantively at issue is the Snows5 claim that these things caused 
Mrs. Snow a heightened risk of recurrence. (R. at 11-13.) 
It must be remembered, Dr. Irion did not give Mrs. Snow cancer. Mrs. Snow 
needed treatment for her cancer irrespective of Dr. Irion's care, and all of the "actual 
damages" sought in this lawsuit are attendant to her cancer treatment. The Snows have 
not alleged any different treatment, or additional injury, due to Dr. Irion's allegedly 
7
 "Personal injury" is defined as "a hurt or damage done to a man's person, such as 
a cut or bruise, a broken limb, or the like . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 402 (6th ed. 
1990). 
8
 In this respect, this case is analogous to Seale. Like the present case, the Seale 
plaintiff did not allege actual injury Seale. 923 P.2d at 1365. Thus, even if the Utah 
Supreme Court were to remand the Medved decision, this Court need not reverse in this 
case as it is well-supported by Seale. 
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substandard care. There is no allegation that Mrs. Snow suffered physical detriment, was 
required to undergo more invasive treatment, or had any other actual injury other than the 
alleged decreased risk of long term survival, because of Dr. Irion's alleged negligence. 
The so-called "injuries" claimed by the Snows, Le^ , loss of income, impairment of 
earning capacity, medical costs, pain, emotional distress, inability to perform household 
and spousal activities, etc., are not actual injuries due to allegedly substandard care by 
Dr. Irion.9 Evaluation of the substance of these allegations demonstrate they are really a 
measure of damages flowing from Mrs. Snow's cancer treatment generally, and the Snows' 
claimed heightened risk of recurrence. 
Thus, like Seale, the Snows have failed to allege actual present damages, Seale, 923 
P.2d at 1365, and their lawsuit was appropriately dismissed. If a plaintiff were permitted 
to avoid the substantive effects of Seale simply by denominating damages as legal injury, 
the Seale holding would become a nullity. Indeed, the result would be the very thing 
which the Seale court sought to avoid: (1) ambiguity in determining whether and when a 
cause of action arises, and (2) increasing speculative lawsuits. Seale, 923 P.2d at 1366. 
9
 Indeed, in Seale, Ms. Seale would have had all of the same "general damages" 
alleged here by the Snows, yet the Utah Supreme Court did not deem them to constitute a 
legal injury sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations. Indeed, the Seale 
court held that the spread of cancer to Ms. Seale's lymph nodes did not even amnount to 
"a legally cognizable injury." Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364-65. 
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B. EVEN IF THE SNOWS HAD ALLEGED ACTUAL 
INJURY, UTAH LAW WOULD STILL NOT ALLOW 
THEM TO PROCEED WITH THEIR SPECULATIVE 
CLAIM FOR HEIGHTENED RISK. 
Even if the Snows had alleged an actual current legal injury, their argument that 
this should allow them to assert a speculative claim for enhanced risk of future cancer still 
fails. It violates the well-established prohibition on splitting actual and speculative claims, 
and is directly contrary to the holdings in both Seale and Medved. Under Utah law, 
"claims cannot be split by plaintiffs." Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364. The Utah Supreme Court 
has made clear: 
[o]nce injury results there is but a single tort and not a series 
of separate torts . . . . [A] plaintiff may not split this cause of 
action by seeking damages for some of his injuries in one suit 
and for later-developing injuries in another. 
Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364. 
Requiring plaintiffs to bring all claims relating to medical negligence in one suit has 
sound basis in policy. It assures plaintiffs are not forced to file premature lawsuits on the 
chance of a recurrence of cancer, while still protecting plaintiffs from the argument that 
awareness of speculative or minor injury starts the statute running and precludes a later 
claim when the recurrence manifests a real and substantial injury. The Seale court stated: 
[M]any of these plaintiffs will be unable to produce the 
necessary evidence to show that the future harm is more likely 
to occur than not. Yet, if the harm, such as the recurrence of 
cancer, later occurs, the plaintiff would be precluded from any 
recovery for devastating injuries by reason of having acquired 
an earlier claim for purely speculative ones. We believe that 
the better approach is to wait until the potential harm 
12 
manifests itself, allowing for more certain proof and fewer 
speculative lawsuits. 
Seak, 923 P.2d at 1366. 
In Medved, this Court examined Seale and the prohibition on claim-splitting, and 
expressly precluded the plaintiff from pursuing her speculative damage claim of heightened 
risk even though she also alleged actual injury. The Medved plaintiff alleged both actual 
and speculative damages arising from a single claim of medical malpractice. Medved, 
2004 UT App. 161, 11 3, 92 P.3d at 178. Specifically, the Medved plaintiff alleged that 
her delayed cancer diagnoses "caused her to undergo more extensive treatment than 
necessary" (actual injury), and also "left her with an increased risk of cancer recurrence.35 
Id. 
Just as the Snows do here, the Medved plaintiff "point [ed] to language from Seale 
for the proposition that she may maintain a claim for the risk of cancer recurrence if she 
also presently claims actual damage.53 Medved, 2004 UT App. 161, H 8, 92 P.3d at 179. 
The Medved Court expressly rejected this contention, stating: "Plaintiffs reliance upon 
Seale for [this] position is misplaced. Seale clearly stands for the proposition that 
speculative claims are not allowed under Utah law." Id. The Medved court held: 
Because both actual and speculative claims arising from a 
single tort cannot be split, we conclude that the trial court 
correcdy dismissed Plaintiffs action without prejudice. 
Medved, 2004 UT App. 161, H 12, 92 P3d at 180. The Medved court further 
concluded that Seale does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff "should be allowed 
13 
to pursue her claim for speculative damages so long as she simultaneously pursues her 
claim for actual damage." Medved. 2004 UT App. 161,11 10, 92 P.3d at 179. Instead, 
"Seale preserves Plaintiffs claim for actual damages until speculative damages become 
actual damages." Id. 
Thus, even if the Snows had alleged an actual current legal injury, their argument 
that this Court should allow them to assert a speculative claim for enhanced risk of future 
cancer still fails under both Seale and Medved. 
POINT III. 
THE SNOWS3 CLAIMS OF UNFAIRNESS ARE 
INCORRECT. 
A. SEALE AND MEDVED ARE POLICY-BASED 
DECISIONS THAT BALANCE THE INTERESTS 
POSED IN CANCER DIAGNOSIS CASES. 
Despite the precedent of the Seale decision, the Snows nevertheless contend that 
the trial court should have declined to dismiss their claim because it would be "unfair" to 
them. (Aplt. Br. at 14-19.) Not only would this be in direct contravention of well-
established Utah law, but the Snows3 claims of one-sided unfairness are incorrect. 
The Seale decision poses fairness problems for both plaintiffs and defendants in 
cancer diagnosis cases. While a plaintiff may contend that it is unfair to prevent her from 
a present recovery of existing damages for having undergone more extensive surgery or 
cancer treatment, she is, however, insulated from the running of the statute of limitations 
and assured that she will not be without a remedy if recurrence occurs in the future. In 
14 
short, premature damage cases are precluded (or delayed) in favor of preserving full rights 
to a remedy for the devastating and non-speculative damage cases. 
Conversely, the effect of Seale is arguably unfair to a defendant physician because it 
prevents the running of the statute of limitations indefinitely, even when the plaintiff is 
aware of a negligent act. The physician, however, is protected by Seale from speculative 
claims and multiple lawsuits arising from the same treatment. 
In Seale, the Utah Supreme Court has balanced these different interests and made a 
sound decision that there shall be only one cause of action in these cases and it will not 
accrue until such time as there is a recurrence of the cancer. The Snows may not like this 
outcome now, but it affords them future protection in the event the worst happens, and it 
is the controlling law in this State. The trial court correctly applied this law and dismissed 
the Snows case without prejudice, allowing them the opportunity to re-file the lawsuit if 
and when there is a recurrence. 
B. THE EXTRAORDINARY INTERVENTIONS REQUESTED BY 
THE SNOWS ARE UNSUPPORTABLE IN UTAH LAW. 
To avoid perceived unfairness issues, the Snows ask this Court to "expressly 
declare[] the statute of limitations suspended indefinitely.M (Aplt. Br. at 14.) Such an 
extraordinary declaration would be purely anticipatory, since there is no argument before 
this Court, or before the trial court, that the limitations period on the Snows3 claims has 
or will expire. Significantly, under Seale, there is no legal injury sufficient to start the 
running of the statute of limitations until there has been a recurrence. Seale, 923 P.2d at 
1364-1366. The Snows conspicuously fail to cite to any legal basis that would allow this 
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Court to indefinitely suspend a limitations period that has been statutorily established by 
the Utah Legislature, before it has even started to run. That is because there is none. 
Nor is there any authority that would permit this Court to reverse the trial court's 
dismissal and "allow the Snows to pursue their claim at a speed appropriate to 
Mrs. Snow's condition," as they request. (Aplt. Br. at 16.) In so arguing, the Snows are 
asking this Court to allow them to indefinitely keep on file a Complaint that fails to state a 
claim upon which can be granted. Again, the Snows cite to no authority to support such 
an usual intervention, or to impose such an onerous burden on Dr. Irion. 
Allowing the Snows to simply leave a deficient Complaint on file would unfairly 
require Dr. Irion to incur the time, expense and burden of monitoring an unripe case 
against him for an unlimited period of time, just in case the Snows3 claims accrue. This 
would be contrary, the stated purpose of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is "to 
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 
1(a). It would, additionally, set precedent in other cases, creating an unworkable situation 
and bogging down the Courts to the disadvantage of all litigants. 
CONCLUSION 
Fortunately, Mrs. Snow has been in remission since completion of her cancer 
treatment. Under Seale, any statistical possibility or even probability of recurrence is 
insufficient to sustain a claim. The trial court thus correctly dismissed the Snows5 lawsuit 
without prejudice. If this Court affirms the trial court's dismissal for the reason that no 
actionable injury presently exists, the Snows will retain the right to file a claim for full 
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recovery if Mrs. Snow suffers a future recurrence. Only if this Court declines to follow 
Seale, and reverses the trial court, will the Snows lose their right to file a claim if Mrs. 
Snow's cancer recurs in the future. 
For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Irion respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
trial court's sound ruling. 
DATED this of April, 2005. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By tfonlifi <3JMMS JtfMSJ*^ 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
CAROLYN STEVENS JENSEN 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of April, 2005, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant/Appellee Richard A. Irion, M.D. were 
mailed postage prepaid thereon, by first class mail in the United State mail, to Douglas G. 
Mortensen, MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C., 648 East 
100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Elliott J. Williams Elli
Carolyn Stevens Jensen 
18 
